Webinar on compensation for increased fuel prices

2024-10-10





Agenda

Introduction by the Swedish EPA (15 min)

Presentation by Matthias Kalkuhl, Mercartor Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (20 min)

Presentation by Daniel Spiro, Uppsala University (20 min)

Presentation by Aaron Malteis, Stockholm Environmental Institute (20 min)

Discussion and questions from the audience (20 min)

Emissions trading system for road transport, buildings and other sectors (ETS 2)



ETS 2 coverage

CO2-emissions from fuels used for combustion in:

- Road transport
- Buildings
- Industries (not already covered by ETS 1)
- Swedish additional sectors agriculture, forestry, aquaculture, fishing and leisure boats

EU target 2030 (vs 1990)

At least 55% net greenhouse gas emissions reduction

ETS 2 - A new system for cap and trade

- Pre defined cap limit set on total amount of emitted CO2, allocated to emission allowances
- Emission allowance 1 ton of CO2
- The participants report emissions every year and surrender corresponding amount of allowances
- Trade allowances on a market
- Carbon price => good conditions for cost-effective reductions
- Upstream system



The Social Climate Fund

- Targeting vulnerable groups such as households in energy or transport poverty
- Funded by revenues from ETS 2 auctioning and partly by member states
- EUR 65 billion over the 2026-2032 period + mandatory 25% contribution from member states
- Support measures and investments aiming to reduce ETS 2 emissions
- Temporary direct income support



Naturvårdsverket and ETS 2

- National competent authority
- Issue greenhouse gas emissions permit
- Review annual emissions reports
- Ensure legal compliance
- Guidance and information
- Support government office





www.utsläppshandel.se

euets@naturvardsverket.se



Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change gGmbH



Carbon Pricing and Compensation

Prof. Dr. Matthias Kalkuhl

10 October 2024



Outline

1. Price Developments

- 2. Vertical and horizontal dimension of unequal costs
- 3. Example of compensation schemes



EU ETS2 – Maximum Prices?

- Emission cap of ~1,000 Mt CO2 in 2027, reduced by 5.1% every year
 - Currently, ~1,200 Mt CO2 in ETS2 sectors
- Price cap 45 EUR in 2020 real prices → 58 EUR in nominal 2027 EUR
 - +20 mln allowances when 45 EUR trigger hit are rather small → no strong price dampening effect
 - +50 mln allowances from MSR when price $\geq 2 \times avg$. price of the last 6 months
 - +150 mln allowances from MSR when price \geq 3 x avg. price of the last 6 months
- Maximum price mechanisms will likely not provide strong relief
 - This is also good to maintain effectiveness and compliance



EU ETS2 Prices

- Sources of price uncertainty
 - Usual demand and supply factors (oil price, economic growth, ...)
- Will ESR hold?
 - Germany: plans to abandon national carbon price for transport and heating when ETS2 takes into effect
 - No strong compliance instrument to meet ESR targets (but possibe to use regulation, subsidies and ad-hoc fuel tax increases)
- How much additional regulation?





Price Developments – According to Macro-Models





Implications for Fuel Prices



Kalkuhl et al. 2023



Implications for Heating Prices



Kalkuhl et al. 2023



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- 3. Example of compensation schemes



Vertical and Horizontal Inequality

The Vertical and Horizontal Inequality Dimensions of the Carbon-Price Burden



30.1.2023

https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/CESifo-Forum-2021-5-edenhofer-kalkuhl-roolfs-carbon-pricing-september.pdf



Relief Potential along the Horizontal (CO2 Intensity/Social Hardship) and Vertical (Income) Inequality Dimension

Absolute Burden on Private Households, Revenue Cycling Options (50 EUR CO₂-price)



Source: Edenhofer, Kalkuhl, Roolfs (2021)

https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/CESifo-Forum-2021-5-edenhofer-kalkuhl-roolfs-carbon-pricing-september.pdf



Asset Devaluation: Climate as a De-facto Housing Wealth Tax



Direct cost of carbon pricing on natural gas & heating oil for German households (EVS 2018 data), NPV until 2045.

(275 EUR/tCO2 in 2030 and increasing at discount rate)

~25% of housing units with heat pump & district heating excluded

Kalkuhl et al. 2024, FEIRE Projekt https://feire.isqd.de/papers/#PolicyBriefs



Paradigms of Compensation Transfers

- Uniform per capita
- Income-dependent (pro-poor)
- Dependent on "exposure" (i.e. costs of carbon pricing)



Some redistribution (if carbon footprint of the rich is higher)



More redistribution from rich to poor possible



No redistribution; minimize losses compared to the status quo

In principle, also possible to have exposure-based transfers conditional on income...

- But detailed information needed
- In general, more efficient to re-distribute via income-tax scheme



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Past Compensations

Rather progressive compensation Rather exposure-based compensation

Introduction of national carbon pricing 2021

- Reduction in power prices (levies on electricity)
- Increases in far-distant commuting allowances
 - Germany: every km commuting distance can be deducted by 30 cts from the taxable income (independent of travel mode)
 - Far-distant commuters: From 21st kilometer, 38 cts/km deductible

Gas and energy crises

- Energy allowance of 300 Eur/cap in 2022
- Adjustments in social security payments
- Discussion on gasoline vouchers but dismissed and replaced by gasoline tax reduction
- (many energy price subsidies, e.g. temporary VAT and energy tax cuts, implicit subsidies)
- ,Gas price break': lump-sum transfer depending on past gas consumption



Way Forward

- Austria: per-capita redistribution with regional differentiation (i.e. people in rural areas receive higher payments due to worse public transport network)
- Germany: Klimageld (uniform per-capita transfer) will not be implemented due to budgetary reasons
- No clear ideas how to avoid hardship cases and high costs from higher carbon prices (SPD tends to fight high carbon prices)
- Germany: New proposal by MCC on homeowners' compensation, based on (past) carbon intensity



Conclusions

- Exposure-based compensation crucial to avoid hard-ship cases along the entire income distribution
 - Difficult to limit also to low-income households due to information problems
 - Broad compensation from carbon price revenues not possible under ETS2 & SCF (but with national funds)
- For building sector: German ,gas price break' as blueprint, MCC proposal on homeowners' compensation would improve targeting substantially
- For transport sector: No proposals yet...
 - Car commuters with existing ICE car seem to be most exposed → lump-sum compensation based on commuting distance and car's vintage ?



Thank you for your attention

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THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF CLIMATE POLICY AND HOW TO MITIGATE THEM

REPORT FOR THE SWEDISH FISCAL POLICY COUNCIL

HTTPS://WWW.FPR.SE/DOWNLOAD/18.2D63770418F379D56435BD1/1714722656 300/KLIMATOMST%C3%A4LLNINGENS%20F%C3%B6RDELNINGSEFFEKTER.PDF

OCTOBER 2024 Daniel Spiro (Uppsala University)

5 questions

- Why are the distributional effects of climate policy important?
- 2. Why do they arise?
- 3. What compensatory tools exist?
- 4. Which groups are the least compensated in Sweden?
- 5. Which compensatory tools should be used?

1) Why are the distributional effects of climate policy important?

- A. Distribution/inequality is important.
- B. Important for the climate transition itself
 - Long run investments
 - □ ←Expectations of future climate policy + transition will take decades
 - Reguires broad acceptability and legitimacy
- c. Swedish/European climate transition as a model for others
 - Protests make it look politically dangerous
- NB: Opposition may be transitory (e.g., smoking bans), policy can then be forced through
- But climate transition lasts for decades, so probably not relevant here

2) Why do distributional effects arise? Carbon pricing and emission intensities



High environmental intensity*

Medium environmental intensity

Low environmental intensity

Kongsamut, Rebelo, Xie, 2001 Engström et al., 2020 *Intensity=emission/euro

2) Why do distributional effects arise? Carbon pricing and emission intensities

- Income distribution: carbon pricing is regressive while rich emit (thus pay) more, poor emit/pay more relative to their income
- Industries with high energy and resource intensity
 - Owners
 - Workers
 - Geographic locations
- □ Geographical distribution for households: rural> suburban/small towns > inner city

2) Why do distributional effects arise?

Long run investments, coordination and expectations

- For single household/firm most emission reductions happen due to nonmarginal investments (change car, insulation, machinery, technology)
- Expectations of what others will do matters for my actions
- Two equilibria: gasoline car+gas stations vs EV+charging stations



2) Why do distributional effects arise?

Long run investments, coordination and expectations

- Credit constraints can trap poor/rural households into high emissions
- Wrong expectations or lack of knowledge (financial literacy)
- Exagarbated by political ambiguity and if transition is delayed so forced to happen in short time



2) Why do distributional effects arise?Which groups bear largest burden?

- Low-income households (esp car owners)
- Rural households
- Energy/CO2-intensive industries
- Workers therein
- Rural regions

3) What compensatory tools exist?

KONCEPTUAL CATEGORIES

- Market forces
- National policy tools
- EU tools
- Community tools (non-political)
- 15 types in report

3) What compensatory tools exist?

The Nordic model and the welfare state

- Adopt technology fast ("creative")
- Causes unemployment and income shocks to certain groups ("destruction")
- So provide insurance by progressive taxation, social security, free school/health/etc
- The welfare state deals with the distributional effects from climate policy that go through *income*
- Much of the adverse/distributional effects from climate policy is in the form of cost shocks: more expensive gasoline, energy, having to invest in new cars etc.
- The welfare state does not compensate for cost shocks

Cost shocks at industry level dealt with by R&D and investment subsidies (in Sweden)

 Hence also workers and regions with high such industry concentration are helped.

4) Which groups are the least compensated?

- Low-income households, esp car owners
- Rural households
- Energy/CO2-intensive industries
- Workers therein
- Rural regions/municipalities

5) How compensate low income and rural households?

Recall why distrbutional effects important

- Distributional/fairness important
- To make climate transition politically feasible and stable
- □ Show rest of world how it can be done



5) How compensate?

GRUPP			BEFIN	ITLIGA ÅTGÄR	DER					MÖJ	LIGA ÅTGÄRD	ER		
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Kommuner glesbygd	х	х		х			х				0	0		0

5) How compensate low income and rural households?

Many strong tools exist for targeting low-income households

- Use carbon tax + lump-sum transfer
- Or lower income tax
- Increase social insurance
- Or lower income taxes

For rural households most tools are weak or imperfect, need several

- Differentiate policy geographicaly
- Collect carbon taxes locally
- Subsidize households' green investments e.g., EV:s
- Subsidize electricity or public transport even at a loss

General

- Make visible, e.g., in tax returns
- Political messaging should be precise and clear
- Slow but steady

Governing a fair transition to a fossil-fuel free society

Aaron Maltais, PhD Senior Research Fellow





FORMAS



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Equitable Transitions Program Director

Team Leader: Energy and Industry Transitions;



Research questions and methods

Who is most at risk of losing out during the transition? Footprint, sociodemographic and geographic analysis & assessment of the distributional impacts of lowcarbon transition policies

Wealth, access, & health

What are the potential losses beyond economic ones?

Online survey

QoL: Leisure activities, social interactions, active citizenship and natural and living environment. What fairness concerns do people at higher risk of losing in the transition raise?

Semi-structured interviews

What principles & policies can guide a fair transition?

Literature review

Food and Transport

Transport

How can policy help to make the transport transition fair and boost political acceptance?

Identifying Transition Assistance Policies (TAPs) for the transport sector:

- Mapping of vulnerability to negative transition impacts.
- Identifying principles of fairness.
- Surveying empirical research what can help to boost public acceptance of transport climate policies.



Variations in emissions footprints



SEI

Dawkins, E., et al. (2023). Who is most at risk of losing out from low-carbon transition in the food and transport sectors in Sweden? Equity considerations from a consumption perspective. *Energy Research & Social Science*, 95:102881. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2022.102881.

Wealth, access, and health impacts of the transition



Group 4 - below mean population density and risk of poverty and social exclusion rates above the mean

- 40% of Sweden's population
- 15.6% of households are classified as 'at risk of poverty and social exclusion'
- Highest proportion of elderly
- Lowest average emissions per capita
- Highest average emissions per capita from vehicle use
- Highest average ownership of cars and SUVs
- Greater average distance to retail, healthcare, and public transport



Dawkins, E., et al. (2023). Who is most at risk of losing out from low-carbon transition in the food and transport sectors in Sweden? Equity considerations from a consumption perspective. *Energy Research & Social Science*, 95:102881. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2022.102881.

Who is at the greatest risk of negative consequences during the transport transition?

- Households with lower incomes in sparsely populated areas with poorer access to services are particularly vulnerable.
- Elderly and younger people with low incomes are overrepresented among those most exposed to negative effects in Sweden.
- Students and low-wage earners in urban peripheries, as well as elderly or pensioners in rural areas, are at high risk of negative effects.



Dawkins, E., et al. (2023). Who is most at risk of losing out from low-carbon transition in the food and transport sectors in Sweden? Equity considerations from a consumption perspective. *Energy Research & Social Science*, 95:102881. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2022.102881.

The National Institute of Economic Research - *Distributional effects* of environmental and climate policy

Diagram 1 Förändring i andel av disponibel inkomst som går till bensin respektive diesel, per inkomstdecil



Procentenheter (vänster) respektive procent (höger)

Andel av disp ink alla 🛲 Andel av disp ink bilägare -- Andel bilägare (höger)

Källa: KI (2023). Miljö, ekonomi och politik 2023:

https://www.konj.se/download/18.5bab959718c38c02b1e3f6e/1701783675528/MEK%20Årlig%20rapport%20december%202023.pdf

The National Institute of Economic Research - *Distributional effects* of environmental and climate policy

Diagram 3 Förändring i andel av disponibel inkomst som går till bensin respektive diesel, per kommuntyp och inkomstnivå



Procentenheter (vänster axel) respektive procent (höger axel)

Källa: KI (2023). Miljö, ekonomi och politik 2023: https://www.konj.se/download/18.5bab959718c38c02b1e3f6e/1701783675528/MEK%20Årlig%20rapport%20december%202023.pdf

Households in areas with lower-than-average population density, who have incomes below the median and have access to a car, make up between 9-10% of the total population.

Källa: KI (2023). Miljö, ekonomi och politik 2023: https://www.konj.se/download/18.5bab959718c38c02b1e3f6e/1701783675528/MEK%20Årlig%20rapport%20december%202023.pdf

Principles of fairness for the transport transition

1. Focus on Abilities, Not Usage

Ability to access and use the transport system to meet needs, not how much or what kind of transport is used.

2. Equitable Public Investment

Everyone should have fair access to transport services, regardless of their economic status. This doesn't mean equal spending per person, but sufficient investment to ensure that everybody's basic transport needs are met.

3. No Widening of Inequality

The shift to a green economy shouldn't unfairly burden low-income or vulnerable groups.

4. Avoiding Large Sudden Costs

People need time and support to adjust to new transport systems. Avoid sudden large changes that cause unexpected financial strain.

Empirical research on resistance/acceptance of climate transport policies

Key determinants of policy acceptance:

- Perceived fairness: esp. distributional fairness
- Effectiveness
- Trust in government

Impact of ideological perspectives in Sweden:

- Right-wing individuals prefer financial incentives (pull policies), while left-wing individuals favour regulatory approaches (push policies).
- Right-leaning individuals find fuel taxes more acceptable with compensation; left-leaning individuals less so.

Some implications for policy design:

- Emphasise distributive fairness.
- Policy mixes: Push and pull policy mixes to enhance acceptance across ideological divides.
- Communication and transparency: esp. on effectiveness and fairness.

Fairness and political acceptability call for targeted support measures for vulnerable groups

Transition assistance policies									
System design measures	Group tailored measures	Mitigating vulnerability outside of but linked to the transport system	Evaluation, communication, and flexibility mechanisms						
 Enhancing public transport for socio-economically disadvantaged populations Equitable expansion of EV charging and active transport solutions 	 Progressive financial incentives and support measures Enhancing access to affordable electric vehicles 	 Inclusive spatial planning for equitable access Supporting services accessibility 	 Assessment and communication of effectiveness and equity outcomes Adaptive policies for predictable economic impacts 						



System Design Measures

- Expanding charging infrastructure in rural areas, where market demand is slower to develop.
- Increased investments in railways to boost capacity and punctuality.
- Pricing strategies that consistently make train travel more cost-competative with car travel.
- Support & regulations ensuring affordable EV charging apartments.
- Reduction of parking space and expansion of public & active transport in urban planning.
- Investment in public transport in urban peripheries and for people with irregular working hours.
- Significant investments in cycling infrastructure.
 - Ireland and Austria 10% of infrastructure planning is earmarked for cycling measures.
 - Norway's Urban Growth Agreements –support system aimed at zero growth in car traffic.

Group-Specific Measures

- Temporary subsidies for electric cars targeted at low-income earners and rural areas.
- Subsidies for the purchase of used electric cars and leasing options for low-income groups.
- Reformed travel tax deductions that encourage sustainable choices while also supporting long-distance commuters a progressive deduction system based on distance combined with tax support that incentivizes low-emission transport options.
- Increased support for demand-responsive transport in sparsely populated areas, especially for the elderly and retirees.
- Targeted support for rural car-dependent residents instead of a general reductions in fuel taxes. This support should gradually decrease over time and remain independent of transport mode, encouraging a shift to more sustainable transportation.

Mitigating Vulnerabilities Related to but Outside the Transport System

- Investments in improved access to healthcare, social services, and education in sparsely populated areas to reduce the need for long-distance travel.
- Increase housing construction in areas with good public transport.
- More support for energy efficiency in households to help manage increased electricity demand associated with EVs.
- Development of digital solutions (e.g., healthcare & work).



Flexibility Mechanisms

- Flexible fuel taxes that allow for gradual and predictable price increases that can be adjusted in the event of global price shocks.
- Public transport pricing where single tickets accumulate towards a monthly pass.

FORMAS - Governing a fair transition to a fossil-free welfare society





www.sei.org/projects/fossil-free-welfare-society/



Energy Research & Social Science Volume 95, January 2023, 102881

Who is most at risk of losing out from low-

carbon transition in the food and transport

sectors in Sweden? Equity considerations

Elena Dawkins °, Claudia Strambo ° 🙎 🔯, Maria Xylia °, Rok Grah ^b, Jindan Gong °,

from a consumption perspective

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Original research article

Katarina Axelsson ª, Aaron Maltais

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How will Sweden's ambitious climate targets change how we eat and get around?

ENERGY RESEARCH SCIENCE



Just transitions in the transport sector: insights from Sweden

Do you ever wonder what all these new transport technologies and policies we read and hear about in media will mean to you? Driverless electric trucks, bans on new petrol-burning cars, tax subsidies for petrol or even for charging stations for private electric vehicles. You might be excited or concerned about the changes these will lead to, on their impacts on how you conduct your day-to-day activities, on your professional opportunities, on your well-being more broadly.

Published on 12 September 2023



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Transportation Research Procedia Volume 78, 2024, Pages 319-326

Analyzing modal choice drivers and transport infrastructure impacts on living environment: insights from a Swedish survey study

Maria Xylia a 🖂 , Claudia Strambo a, Jindan Gong a